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THE DEMISE OF THE PUBLIC FIGURE IN
DEFAMATION CASES AND THE ASCENT OF A
RESPONSIBLE PRESS-TIME, INC. V. FIRESTONE
Defamation actions brought against publishers present a conflict be-
tween the individual's interest in redressing an injury to his reputation
and the press' assertion of First Amendment protection. At common
law, a qualified press privilege served to accommodate the two interests.
The press was granted immunity for erroneous publications made in the
course of reporting on matters of public concern.' This conflict was
raised to constitutional proportions in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
which held that press liability for a misstatement of fact about a public
official was constitutionally permissible only if the press acted with
actual malice.' Subsequently, the Supreme Court expanded this consti-
tutional privilege to include press reports of public figures.' Time, Inc.
v. Firestone4 represents the Court's latest attempt to balance freedom
of the press with the individual's right to protect his reputation. In
Firestone, the Court held that the wife of a prominent industrialist, who
held press conferences about a pending divorce, was not a public figure
and did not need to show that the news item about her divorce was
published with actual malice in order to recover.5 The Court's applica-
tion of the public/private figure distinction indicates that the present
Court is taking a step in the right direction by allowing the states to
impose greater liability upon the press in defamation cases.'
The purpose of this Note is to compare Firestone with prior decisions
in order to demonstrate that the public/private figure distinction has
1. See Flues v. New Nonpareil Co., 155 Ia. 290, 135 N.W. 1083 (1912); Meriwether v.
Publishers: George Knapp & Co., 120 Mo. App. 354, 97 S.W. 257 (1906). See also W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §118, at 819 (4th ed. 1971).
2. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 283 (1964).
3. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
4. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
5. Id. at 455, 457.
6. The Firestone decision has been criticized extensively by commentators who equate
the demand for a responsible press with the erosion of First Amendment freedoms. See,
e.g., Anderson, A Response to Professor Robertson: The Issue Is Control of Press Power,
54 TEXAS L. REV. 271 (1976); McKenna, Time, Inc. v. Firestone: More Than A New Public
Figure Standard, 20 ST. Louis U. L.J. 625 (1976); McKey, Defamation Law After Time,
Inc. v. Firestone, 13 IDAHO L. REV. 53 (1976); Comment, Time, Inc. v. Firestone: Sowing
the Seeds of Gertz, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 123 (1976); Comment, Time, Inc. v. Firestone:
The Supreme Court's Restrictive New Libel Ruling, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 435 (1977);
Note, The Firestone Case: A Judicial Exercise in Press Censorship, 25 EMORY L.J. 705
(1976).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
been applied inconsistently by the Court and is based upon faulty prem-
ises. This Note also will suggest that the rationale for the actual malice
standard only requires that this standard be applied when public offi-
cials are involved. A single standard for all other plaintiffs would be a
more workable approach.
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION
Mary Alice Firestone filed suit in a Florida court for separate mainte-
nance from her husband, a wealthy industrialist, and her husband coun-
terclaimed for divorce on the grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery.
The trial court granted a divorce and awarded Mary Firestone alimony.
Without specifying on which of the two grounds the counterclaim was
based, the court concluded that "neither party is domesticated, within
the meaning of that term as used by the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida. . . ."I On the basis of newspaper and wire service reports plus
information furnished from a bureau chief and a free lance reporter,
Time published a magazine item reporting that the husband was
granted a divorce on the grounds of "extreme cruelty and adultery."'
Prior to publication, no one employed by Time had actually read the
court decree.' Under Florida law at that time, "a wife found guilty of
adultery could not be awarded alimony."' 0 After Time refused to print
a retraction," Mary Firestone brought a libel action in state court. The
jury verdict in her favor ultimately was affirmed by the Florida Supreme
Court.'"
Justice Rehnquist delivered the Court's opinion in which Chief Jus-
tice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Powell joined." In
7. See 424 U.S. at 451.
8. Id. at 451-52. The Time article read:
DIVORCED. By Russell A. Firestone, Jr., 41, heir to the tire fortune: Mary
Alice Sullivan Firestone, 32, his third wife; a onetime Palm Beach school
teacher; on grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery; after six years of marriage,
one son; in West Palm Beach, Fla. The 17-month intermittent trial produced
enough testimony of extramarital adventures on both sides, said the judge, "to
make Dr. Freud's hair curl."
Id. at 452.
9. Id. at 459 n.5.
10. Id. at 462. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §61.08 (1969) (amended 1976).
11. Under Florida law, a prerequisite for bringing a libel action is a demand for a
retraction. 424 U.S. at 452 n.1, citing FLA. STAT. ANN. §§770.01-.02 (1963).
12. Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So.2d 172, 178 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1974).
13. Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, with which Justice Stewart joined,
stressed that the evidence suggested that Time had "exercised considerable care in check-
ing the accuracy of the story prior to its publication" and may not have been negligent.
424 U.S. at 466 (Powell, J., concurring). Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall dissented.
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rendering the decision, the Court rejected petitioner's arguments that
the news item constituted a report of judicial proceedings and automati-
cally required application of the actual malice privilege." After refusing
to recognize a blanket privilege for reports of judicial proceedings,"5 the
Court held that Mary Firestone need not prove that Time published the
libelous matter with actual malice in order to recover, since she was not
a public figure.'" All that was necessary to impose liability on the press
was a showing that Time was guilty of some degree of fault," with the
actual degree of fault to be determined by the state.'" The case was
remanded to the Florida courts to determine whether the news item was
"the product of some fault" on the publisher's part. 9
By narrowly construing the public figure classification, the Firestone
opinion continues a recent trend toward allowing the states to impose
greater liability on the press. Prior to 1974, press liability was condi-
tioned upon a showing of actual malice if the article was about a public
official, a public figure, or a matter of public interest. 0 These three
Both Brennan and Marshall felt that the actual malice standard should be applied,
although they disagreed as to the reason why. Brennan believed the item was a report of
a judicial proceeding, id. at 471 (Brennan, J., dissenting), while Marshall would have
categorized Mary Firestone as a public figure. Id. at 484 (Marshall, J., dissenting). White
addressed the issue of negligence and would have affirmed the court below because he felt
there was ample evidence to support the jury verdict that the item was false and defama-
tory. Id. at 481-82. (White, J., dissenting).
14. 424 U.S. at 455. Petitioner also had argued that the actual malice standard was
required because Mary Firestone was a public figure, well-known as a prominent member
of the '400' of Palm Beach society, and a figure in a public controversy by virtue of the
fact that her divorce was a cause celebre. Brief for Petitioner at 31-33, Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
15. 424 U.S. at 456.
16. Id. at 455, 457.
17. Id. at 461.
18. Id. at 461-64. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974), the Court
held that the press cannot be held strictly liable for defamatory statements, but the states
may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability to be imposed on a pub-
lisher.
19. 424 U.S. at 463-64.
20. Actual malice was defined in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280
(1964), as knowledge that the defamatory statement was false or published with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not. In New York Times the actual malice test was
applied to an article concerning a public official. Three years later the test was extended
to articles concerning public figures. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155
(1967). See also id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring). The outer limits of the actual malice
standard were reached in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43-44 (1971),
where the rule was extended to matters concerning the public interest. The Rosenbloom
"public interest" theory was subsequently rejected by the Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974). In Gertz, the Court held that "extension of the New York
19771
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categories of plaintiffs were required to show actual malice with con-
vincing clarity in order to recover.2 Thus, the press was granted sub-
stantial freedom in its reporting, with liability for defamation imposed
in very limited circumstances."
The Court's position shifted in 1974 with Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
which held that the press cannot claim the protection of the actual
malice standard when writing about a private individual who has been
defamed concerning a matter of public interest.2" In Gertz, the Court
clarified the type of conduct that would subject the press to liability. 4
A public figure must prove a defamatory item was printed with actual
malice to recover,2" while a private figure can recover upon a lesser
Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom plurality would abridge the legitimate state
interest [in providing a remedy for defamation] to a degree that we find unacceptable."
Id. at 346. See Note, Time, Inc. v. Firestone: Is Rosenbloom Really Dead?, 31 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 216 (1976).
21. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-43, 346 (1974), citing New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (public official); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130 (1967) (public figure); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971)
(matter of public interest).
22. Few plaintiffs have been able to recover under the actual malice standard. The
Supreme Court, as well as lower courts, has consistently held in favor of the press. Because
courts have broadly construed the terms public official and public figure, individuals have
had little remedy against press defamation under the actual malice standard. See Monitor
Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 277 (1971) (charge of criminal conduct against an official
or candidate for public office always invokes the New York Times actual malice standard);
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) (government employee having substantial
responsibility for conducting and supervising government affairs is a public official);
Arber v. Stahlin, 10 Mich.App. 181, 186, 159 N.W.2d 154, 157 (1968), rev'd, 382 Mich.
300, 170 N.W.2d 45 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 924 (1970) (members of political organi-
zations defamed by the press were considered public figures because they were identified
with persons of political prominence); Rose v. Koch, 278 Minn. 235, 260, 154 N.W.2d 409,
426 (1967) (university professor elected to the legislature was a public figure); Tilton v.
Cowles Publishing Co., 76 Wash.2d 707, 717, 459 P.2d 8, 14 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S.
927 (1970) (policemen and firemen who voluntarily ran for positions on the public safety
council were public figures).
But see Herbert v. Lando, 74 Civ. 434-CSH (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 1977). In Herbert, a
United States District Court significantly expanded the boundaries of pre-trial discovery
in a public figure defamation suit. The court allowed discovery into the formerly sacro-
sanct area of a newsman's thoughts and motives in putting together a story. Noting the
difficulty a public figure plaintiff has in proving actual malice, the court said that ex-
panded pre-trial discovery would be the best way of surmounting this difficult barrier.
23. 418 U.S. 323, 339-48 (1974).
24. Id. at 342-43. Gertz was the first case to deal specifically with the degree of protec-
tion for the press when private figures are defamed, although New York Times introduced
the actual malice standard for public officials. See note 65 infra.
25. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162-64 (1967)(Warren, C.J., concur-
ring).
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showing of fault to be determined by the state."3
The Firestone Court did not question the validity of the public/private
figure distinction. The Court applied the same criteria used in previous
Supreme Court cases to determine who is a public figure. 7 First, if a
person occupies a position of "persuasive power and influence," she is a
public figure with respect to any news item published about her., Sec-
ond, if she thrusts herself to the forefront of a specific public contro-
versy, she is a public figure, but only with respect to that controversy.'
Mary Firestone was not, the Court found, a public figure under the first
test because she "did not assume any role of especial prominence in the
affairs of society, other than perhaps Palm Beach society . . 30 Nor
did her actions make her a public figure under the second test because
she did not "thrust herself to the forefront of any particular public
controversy ... ."I' The Court emphasized that Mary Firestone did not
choose to be a public figure but was compelled to "[riesort to the
judicial process" in order to obtain a divorce.32
In two prior defamation cases, the Supreme Court has had to deter-
mine whether the individuals involved were public or private figures.
The Court in both Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts33 and Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. " used the same criteria for making this determination, but
the application of the public/private figure standard resulted in a differ-
ent conclusion in each case. In Curtis, the Court held that a former
University of Georgia football coach was a public figure solely by virtue
of his position in the sports world.35 In a case consolidated with Curtis,
the Court found that a politically active citizen was a public figure when
he purposefully thrust himself into the "vortex" of a civil rights contro-
versy concerning the enrollment of a black student."
In Gertz, the Court found that a well-known Chicago lawyer was not
a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts by virtue of his
position, in spite of the fact that he had considerable stature as a lawyer,
author, lecturer, and participant in community and professional af-
26. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
27. 424 U.S. at 453, quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
28. Id. at 453.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 454, quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1971).
33. 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
34. 418 U.S. 323, 351-52 (1974).
35. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 135-36, 155-58 (1967).
36. Id. at 140, 155.
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fairs.:7 Nor was he, the Court concluded, a public figure because of his
voluntary role as legal counsel in a civil suit resulting from a murder
committed by a Chicago policeman, for this role was not the one which
invited press coverage.3" Rather, the statements written about him re-
lated to the criminal trial of the policeman, a matter in which Gertz was
not directly involved.3 Furthermore, the defamation related to Gertz's
personal political beliefs rather than to his activities as legal counsel for
the victim's family.'
A comparison of Firestone with Curtis and Gertz demonstrates an
inconsistency in the Court's application of the public figure test. The
factual situations in Firestone and Curtis were so similar that the Court
should have reached the same determination on the public figure issue.
However, the plaintiffs in Curtis were classified as public figures, while
Firestone was not. It seems illogical to conclude that the first plaintiff
in Curtis, Wally Butts, was more prominent than Mary Firestone. His
notoriety arose from his activities in the sports world,4' while hers arose
from her position in the society world.42 The plaintiff in the case consoli-
dated with Curtis, Edwin Walker, was a leader in a civil rights demon-
stration and was considered a public figure because his activities were
the focus of press coverage. 3 Mary Firestone, on the other hand, initi-
ated press coverage about her divorce. In this respect, she was more
assertive in inviting publicity. In concluding that she was not a public
figure, the Court apparently relied on the fact that, unlike Walker's civil
rights demonstration, her divorce was not a public controversy."
Although the Court came to the same conclusion, that the plaintiffs
in both Firestone and Gertz were private figures, the factual situations
in these two cases appear to require different results. In Gertz, the
lawyer did not voluntarily invite publicity when he agreed to represent
a client.'" Similarly, Mary Firestone did not voluntarily resort to the
judicial process but was compelled to do so to obtain a divorce. Unlike
Gertz, however, Firestone called press conferences to publicize her situa-
37. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351-52 (1974).
38. Id. at 325-26, 352.
39. Id. at 352. The news item emphasized an allegedly Communist conspiracy of which
Gertz was said to be a member and accused Gertz of having a criminal record and being
a Communist fronter. Id. at 326.
40. Id. at 326.
41. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1967).
42. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453 (1976).
43. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
44. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976).
45. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974).
46. 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976).
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tion. The Firestone Court found that the plaintiff's voluntary act of
calling press conferences insignificant.4" But on this ground, it would
seem that Firestone was more of a public figure than Gertz. In Gertz,
the defamation concerned the plaintiff's political beliefs, not his activi-
ties as a prominent lawyer.4 8 Firestone was defamed about her divorce,
the very controversy which resulted in publicity. Thus, while the con-
tours of the public/private figure test are well-established and seemingly
clear, they have not been applied uniformly or consistently to various
fact situations. The Firestone decision exemplifies this problem. At
present, neither the press nor the individual is put on notice as to how
the criteria will be applied in determining who is a public figure.,9
The Firestone opinion concerned itself with an analysis, under the
specific factual situation of the case, of why Mary Firestone is a private
figure.'" It indicates that the Court will continue to apply the pub-
lic/private figure classification in determining standards of press liabil-
ity, but in the future the public figure category will be construed more
narrowly. However, the decision fails to reexamine the theoretical foun-
dation for the two-tier standard or to question whether such a standard
is compatible with the First Amendment.5
47. Id. at 454-55 n.3.
48. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 325-26.
49. As Justice Black warned, no one can know what is constitutionally libelous after
the Curtis decision. According to Black, the problem is that the Court is utilizing "various
experimental expedients" in libel cases which hinge on how offensive the particular libel
judgment may be to the Court. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 171-72 (1967)
(Black, J., dissenting).
50. 424 U.S. at 452-57.
51. Some legal scholars already have questioned the intellectual validity of the two-
level theory in other areas of First Amendment freedoms. The late University of Chicago
Professor Harry Kalven, Jr. questioned the validity of the two-level theory of free speech
in obscenity cases. He criticized the Court's reliance on the classification system because
it did not provide a consistent framework for what speech will be protected. See Kalven,
The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SuP. CT. Rgv. 1, 10, 15.
Professor Kenneth L. Karst of the University of California, building on Kalven's analy-
sis, believes that a two-level theory is inconsistent with the principle of equality of expres-
sion and violates the presumption against regulation of the content of speech. Karst argues
that the equality principle is the heart of the First Amendment and demands that all
speakers and points of view are entitled to the same degree of protection. He maintains
that recognition of the equality principle by the Court will compel a reevaluation of several
of their previous doctrines to eliminate inconsistent decisions. Karst's analysis was in the
framework of a discussion of the government's power to restrict free expression, but his
analysis also would seem appropriate to an evaluation of the government's power to
restrict a free press. See Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment,
43 U. Cm. L. REv. 20, 29-35 (1975). The two-tier standard of protection in the area of
defamation law has not been analyzed from this point of view, but under such an analysis,
the standard may prove to be constitutionally untenable.
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THE BASIS FOR THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE FIGURE DISTINCTION
The public/private figure categorization 2 is based on the theory that
public figures have access to a forum from which to rebut false state-
ments made about them, but private individuals do not. 3 Public figures
also are granted less protection because they voluntarily assume the risk
of being defamed when they choose to enter the public sphere.54 There-
fore, a public figure can recover from the press for defamatory state-
ments only upon a showing that such statements were made "with
'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reck-
less disregard of whether it was false or not.""5 On the other hand,
because private individuals have no means to rebut false statements
made about them, they can recover upon a showing of some fault; actual
malice need not be proven. 6
This distinction is somewhat fallacious. Absent "right to reply"5 or
retraction statutes,6 the content of published material is determined by
the newspaper, not the public figure. Unless the public figure controls
his own newspaper or is wealthy enough to buy newspaper space, his
access to a forum for rebuttal may be as limited as the private individ-
ual's. The press may provide more coverage of public figures, but this
does not assure in any way that the individual's position will be stated
accurately or given equal publicity.59
52. For a comprehensive analysis of the two-tier protection standard, see Robertson,
Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEx.
L. REV. 199, 220-30 (1976).
53. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
54. Id. at 344-45.
55. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
56. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-48 (1974).
57. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 247, 258 (1974), the Court
held that a statute granting any candidate an enforceable right to reply to criticism the
newspaper had printed about him was violative of the First Amendment. The decision
indicates that any statutory provision dictating what the press must print is unconstitu-
tional. For a discussion of the access issue, see, e.g., Barron, Access to the Press-A New
First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967); Lange, The Role of the Access
Doctrine in the Regulation of the Mass Media: A Critical Review and Assessment, 52 N.C.
L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1973).
58. The Massachusetts retraction statute is typical of retraction statutes currently in
force in a number of states. It provides for mitigation of damages upon a printed retraction
of the allegedly libelous publication. Offer by the publisher to print a "reasonable retrac-
tion" is evidence that the publication was printed in good faith and without actual malice.
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, §93 (1969).
59. The print media is big business today, and the power and influence of the press
controls the flow of information and monopolizes the marketplace of ideas. Of necessity,
the press is selective about the ideas it chooses to promulgate. See Miami Herald Publish-
ing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 249-50. See also Comment, New Challenges to Newspa-
per Freedom of the Press-The Struggle for Right of Access and Attacks on Cross-Media
Ownership, 24 DEPAUL L. REV. 165. 170 (1974).
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In contrast, public officials have significantly greater access to the
communications media. For this reason, the Court justified applying the
actual malice standard to public officials."0 This standard is also
founded on our country's "profound national commitment to the princi-
ple that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open .... "' An uncensored press has been afforded a special place
in the hierarchy of constitutional guarantees because the free flow of
ideas is essential to the health of a self-governing society 2 and to a
citizen's essential participation in that democracy. 3 The actual malice
standard was developed for public officials so that citizens would be free
to criticize public employees in their official capacities.6 ' Neither of
these reasons, access to a forum for rebuttal or the need for freedom to
criticize officials, applies to individuals who are not public officials. 5 In
addition, states have a substantial interest in protecting citizens from
unjustifiable damages to their reputations." The absence of the two
rationales for applying the actual malice standard plus the countervail-
ing state interest indicates that the actual malice standard need not be
imposed unless public officials are involved.
60. Id. at 304-05.
61. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
62. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 149 (1967).
63. In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, the Court stated:
Great responsibility is ...placed upon the news media to report fully and
accurately the proceedings of government . . . .Without the information pro-
vided by the press most of us and many of our representatives would be unable
to vote intelligently or to register opinions on the administration of government
generally.
420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975).
64. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 304 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring).
65. The Court first extended the actual malice requirement to plaintiffs who are public
figures in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). But the Curtis Court clearly
explained that the particular considerations which demanded the actual malice standard
in New York Times were not involved in a case dealing with a public figure instead of a
public official. Id. at 154. The Court acknowledged that New York Times was close to
seditious libel and concerned an area of the law which relates to the free debate of govern-
ment polices. Id.
In Curtis, the Court relied on only one of the rationales expressed in New York Times,
concluding that both of the plaintiffs "commanded sufficient continuing public interest"
and access to the media to justify requiring a higher standard of proof. Id. at 155. Yet,
the plurality opinion did not require the actual malice standard, only that the plaintiff
show "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards
of investigating and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." Id. at 155
(emphasis added). It was Chief Justice Warren's separate opinion which explicitly re-
jected a differentiation between public officials and public figures. Id. at 163-64 (Warren,
C.J., concurring).
66. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).
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A SUGGESTED APPROACH
The public/private figure distinction has been applied inconsistently
by the Court, and even the theoretical basis for the categorization is
questionable. The rationale for the actual malice standard applies only
when public officials are involved. A standard which does not require
classification of plaintiffs would be more consistent than the current
two-tier standard. The common law approach of evaluating press liabil-
ity is more rational. One standard of fault, as determined by each state,
would permit recovery regardless of the status of the individual unless
he is a public official. Whether the plaintiff is a public official can be
determined readily. One standard of liability for all other plaintiffs
would eliminate having to determine whether the plaintiff should be
classified as a public or private figure.
Adoption of a standard of negligence for all individuals other than
public officials would put the press on notice as to what quantum of
fault would subject it to liability in defamation actions. A standard of
negligence for the press could be developed quickly and readily if the
Court allows the states to embrace this standard.67 At the same time,
the press would be immunized if it acted in a responsible and prudent
manner.
The negligence standard has been shown to be constitutionally suffi-
cient with respect to a private figure. There is no reason to believe that
the standard of negligence would not be adequate with respect to public
figures" or that it would not provide a sufficiently acceptable margin of
error to give freedom of expression the "breathing space" it "need[s] .
• .to survive . "..."70 The press today can utilize its financial and
intellectual resources to develop methods of checking the accuracy of
67. The Supreme Court already has begun to define the standards of negligence for the
press. See Robertson, supra note 52, at 251, citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 287-88 (1964) ("publishing an editorial advertisement submitted by prominent,
credible, and responsible people without checking its accuracy against news stories in the
paper's own files was 'at most' negligence"); and Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 391
(1967) (since "checking with the author would have revealed a high degree of fictionaliza-
tion, the facts 'would support either a jury finding of innocence or mere negligent misstate-
ment' ").
Common law cases are also helpful in defining a negligence standard for the press. See,
e.g., Turner v. Hearst, 115 Cal. 394, 47 P. 129 (1896) (reliance on an unverified report can
be judged to be negligence); Park v. Detroit Free Press Co., 72 Mich. 560, 40 N.W. 731
(1888) (reporters must use care to reasonably prevent mistake).
68. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
69. The plurality in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967), utilized a
"reasonable publisher" standard. See note 65 supra.
70. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964).
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news items in order to shield it from a charge of negligence. At the same
time, by limiting damages to actual injury, the press can be protected
from outrageously large damage judgments.' The principle of limiting
damages to actual injury, established in Gertz" and adhered to in
Firestone,7 will stem any threat of a flood of lawsuits. If the courts
prohibit presumed and punitive damages and require a high standard
of proof of actual injury, the number of lawsuits will be minimized. The
press also can be given opportunities to mitigate liability by making use
of retraction statutes whenever inadvertent error occurs. The press
today is not "easily intimidated,"7 and requiring it to pay for occasional
negligence will not lead to self-censorship" but may lead to self-
discipline.
CONCLUSION
The problem is not whether regulation of the press is permissible but
what standard of liability will best accommodate the conflicting inter-
ests of the press and the individual. Any judicial method of restricting
expression of the print media must be approached cautiously. This does
not mean that legal intervention is impossible or undesirable. The
Firestone decision is a step in the right direction in striking an accepta-
ble balance between two important interests. The print media cannot
expect to stand behind the shield of First Amendment protection for
libelous statements without demonstrating that it gathered and re-
ported the news in a responsible manner. It remains for the Court to
decide whether it will broaden the Firestone holding and allow the states
to apply their own standards of liability in defamation actions. If so, the
Court at last may begin to solve a problem it has been wrestling with
for the past fifteen years. By allowing states to adopt one standard for
all persons other than public officials, the interests of individuals wish-
ing to protect their reputations and the interests of the press in main-
taining autonomy and integrity can be accommodated.
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